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EGG DONATION: WHETHER A WOMAN HAS 
A PROPERTY RIGHT IN HER OWN EGG AND 
HOW DONORS SHOULD BE TAXED 
Richard Gano* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
To many, the idea that a woman has a property right in her own 
body seems obvious. While courts have granted individuals a property 
right in their own blood, breast milk, and sperm,1 the issue of whether 
a woman has a property right in her own eggs is still undecided.2 This 
lack of clarity leaves many tax scholars and egg donors alike asking 
whether the payment received for egg donation should be taxable 
income.3 Neither the Tax Court nor the IRS has addressed whether the 
payment should be taxable as income or, due to the trauma the 
woman’s body endures, “damages,” and therefore excludible.4 The 
question remains: how would the tax court analyze such a case? 
A thriving market has formed in the United States around fertility, 
especially egg donation.5 Although not every jurisdiction allows for 
payments in exchange for an egg donation, brokers and donors can be 
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 1. Blood: see United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979); Sperm: see Hecht v. 
Superior Court, 20 Cal Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (1993). Breast Milk: Bridget J. Crawford, Our Bodies, 
Our (tax) Selves, 31 VA. TAX. REV. 695, 719–20 (2012). 
 2. See Tony Nitti, The Top Ten Tax Cases (And Rulings) Of 2015: #10-Cash For Egg 
Donation Is Taxable Income, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2015 1:35 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2015/10/26/the-top-ten-tax-cases-and-rulings-of-2015-
10-cash-for-egg-donation-is-taxable-income/#27cebb792d9f (stating egg donation has “led to a 
rather big tax conundrum: do the amounts received by the donor in exchange for her eggs constitute 
taxable income?”). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Eggs as Capital: Human Egg Procurement in the Fertility Industry and 
the Stem Cell Research Enterprise, 34 J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 763, 770 (2009). 
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paid anywhere from “$3,000 to tens of thousands of dollars per 
cycle.”6 Even though the donor is being compensated for her 
“service,” she is called an egg donor.7  
From a health perspective the donation process is intrusive.8 The 
side effects can be severe: depression, short-term memory issues, 
insomnia, bleeding, weight gain, and sometimes even death.9 The 
donor must be constantly monitored, and the ultimate long term effects 
on the human body are still unknown.10 There is little dispute that the 
process is incredibly painful and damaging to the donor.11 Because of 
the traumatic bodily experience the woman endures, some previous 
egg donors believe that some, if not all, of the payments received 
should be non-taxable.12 
II.  TAX LAW: EGG DONATION AS INCOME OR DAMAGES 
Although an egg donor may feel the trauma her body has endured 
entitles her to non-taxable “damages,” the tax code uses a systematic 
way to determine the tax consequences of any payment. The Internal 
Revenue Code uses a broad definition of gross income.13 Gross 
income includes “all income from whatever source derived, including 
(but not limited to) . . . [c]ompensation for services.”14 An individual 
will be taxed on “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, 
and over which the taxpayer [has] complete dominion.”15 However, 
there are numerous exclusions. One such exclusion is for “the amount 
of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by 
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) 
on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”16 The 
Treasury Regulations define damages as “an amount received (other 
than workers’ compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 771. 
 8. Id. at 770. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51, 52 (2015). 
 12. See Emily’s Mom, Comment to Donor Egg and Tax Deduction, FERTILE THOUGHTS (May 
5, 2005, 10:35 AM), http://www.fertilethoughts.com/forums/donor-issues-egg-and-sperm-
/317108-donor-egg-tax-deduction.html. 
 13. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992) (stating, “The definition of gross income 
under the Internal Revenue Code sweeps broadly.”). 
 14. I.R.C. § 61 (1954). 
 15. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 16. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012); See 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012). 
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action, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of 
prosecution.”17  
With the advent of the egg donor market, the tax implications of 
a payment received by an egg donor are unclear.18 With such a 
damaging and intrusive process, some egg donors try to exclude the 
payment from income.19 In a recent case, Perez v. Commissioner20, the 
Tax Court held that the payment received by egg donor Nichelle Perez 
was taxable, barring Perez’s exclusion of the payment as “damages” 
under code section 104(a)(2).21 In doing so, the court held that a 
lawsuit, or threat of one, is a valid requirement in the Treasury 
Regulations under 104(a)(2).22 However, the court failed to clarify 
whether a woman has a property right in her eggs and the possible tax 
implications.23  
This Comment takes the position that the court in Perez correctly 
upheld the regulation. However, the court should have instead given 
Perez a property right in her eggs and analyzed the subsequent tax 
implications. As background, Part III of this Comment reviews the 
facts of Perez. Part IV explores the court’s holding in depth. Part V 
discusses how the court should have recognized Perez’s property right 
in her eggs, and how the court should have analyzed the subsequent 
tax implications. Part VI concludes by recommending that a court, 
when presented with the issue, clarify whether a woman has a property 
right in her eggs. 
III.  CASE HISTORY 
In Perez, the court examined the medical procedures Perez 
endured and the contractual language between Perez and the donor 
company.24 Both played a key role in the court’s determination that 
the payment Perez received was taxable.25 The court focused on two 
 
 17. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012). 
 18. See Robert W. Wood, Taxing Egg Donations with the Wisdom of Solomon, TAX NOTES 
(July 12, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/settlements-and-dispute-resolution/ 
taxing-egg-donations-wisdom-solomon/2015/07/02/14900991. 
 19. See FERTILE THOUGHTS, supra note 12. 
     20.  144 T.C. 51 (2015). 
 21. Id. at 63. 
 22. Id. at 58–63. Although the statute itself has the lawsuit requirement, Perez questioned the 
regulation’s interpretation. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012). 
 23. Perez, 144 T.C. at 56. 
 24. Id. at 53–56. 
 25. Id. at 62. 
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key points: 1) Perez signed a waiver prior to undergoing the donation 
procedures, and; 2) the procedures were within the scope of the 
contract.26 
A.  Factual History 
1.  Personal Background 
In 2009, Nichelle Perez, a 29-year-old woman from Orange 
County, California, donated her eggs to a non-profit company called 
The Donor Source on two separate occasions.27 The company is one 
of thirty egg donation agencies in California, and supervised 
approximately 250 egg-donation cycles in 2009 alone.28 Like many 
other egg donation companies, The Donor Source conducts an 
exhaustive preliminary assessment.29 To pass the initial screening, 
donors must be between the ages of 21 and 30, have a relatively clean 
medical history, and pass a series of psychological and physical tests.30 
Once approved, the donor creates a profile in hopes of being selected 
by prospective parents.31 The donor is promised future payment only 
if she is selected by prospective parents.32 
For Perez, the entire process was very painful.33 Perez started by 
taking birth control pills for approximately one month to synchronize 
her menstrual cycle with that of the egg recipient.34 Once her cycle 
was synchronized with the recipient’s, Perez traveled repeatedly to a 
fertility clinic to undergo intrusive physical examinations, pregnancy 
tests, invasive ultrasound examinations, and blood draws.35 At home, 
she injected herself in the stomach with daily hormones using a one-
inch needle, causing bruising and pain.36 She testified that the 
injections were “actually very painful . . . it was burning the entire 
time you were injecting it.”37 As the retrieval date approached, the 
frequency of the injections increased from once a day to three times a 
 
 26. Id. at 60–62. 
 27. Id. at 52, 55. 
 28. Id. at 52. 
 29. See id. at 52–53. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 53. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 55. 
 34. Id. at 54. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 54–55. 
 37. Id. at 55. 
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day.38 Every time she gave herself a new shot “she had to search for a 
part of her stomach not already covered in bruises.”39 In a nine-day 
period alone, Perez injected herself around 22 times.40 On top of all of 
this, the final injection was an “intramuscular injection in the lower 
hip that goes through a two-inch needle” and “caused Perez significant 
physical pain deep in her muscles as well as extreme abdominal 
bloating.”41  
On the retrieval date, March 27, 2009, she was required to 
undergo anesthesia and was informed of the possible risk of death.42 
The doctor penetrated Perez’s ovaries and removed between 15 and 
20 eggs, well above the body’s normal production of just one.43 After 
the procedure, Perez “felt cramped and bloated; she had mood swings, 
headaches, nausea, and fatigue.”44 For this entire process, Perez 
received a check for $10,000.45 Perez then went back for a second 
round the same year in August, undergoing the same procedures and 
signing the same contracts stating that payment was “in consideration 
for all of her pain, suffering, time, inconvenience, and efforts”.46 Perez 
again received $10,000 for her donation.47 
2.  Contractual Language 
Once a donor is selected by a recipient, The Donor Source has the 
donor sign two contracts: one with The Donor Source and one with 
the prospective parents.48 The contract signed with the company gives 
The Donor Source the ability to terminate the agreement up to the time 
the donor begins to receive hormone injections for egg-stimulation.49 
Perez signed her first contract in February 2009, which included the 
following provision: 
Donor Fee: Donor and Intended Parents will agree upon a 
Donor Fee for Donor’s time, effort, inconvenience, pain, and 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 56. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 53. 
 49. Id. 
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suffering in donating her eggs. This fee is for Donor’s good 
faith and full compliance with the donor egg procedure, not 
in exchange for or purchase of eggs and the quantity or 
quality of eggs retrieved will not affect the Donor Fee.50 
The contract additionally allocated foreseeable risk by specifying 
that the donor assumes “all medical risks and agree[s] to hold The 
Donor Source harmless from any and all liability for any and all 
physical or medical harm to herself . . . .”51 Further, at the moment the 
eggs are removed, they immediately become the property of the 
intended parents.52  
3.  Procedural History 
The Donor Source sent Perez a Form 1099 for the $20,000 she 
was paid for the 2009 tax year.53 Unsure about how to classify the 
payments, she consulted other egg donors online.54 She concluded that 
the money was not taxable because it compensated her for pain and 
suffering under code section 104(a)(2).55 The Commissioner disagreed 
and sent Perez a notice of deficiency.56 Perez filed a petition, and the 
Tax Court tried the case in California.57 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Statutory Analysis 
Since 1918, the Internal Revenue Code has recognized an 
exclusion for payments from personal injuries and sickness.58 This 
exclusion is most clearly stated in section 104(a)(2), but what exactly 
qualifies as “damages” for the exclusion has changed over time.59 The 
regulations currently define “damages” as “[an amount] received 
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic 
 
 50. Id. at 54. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 56. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; see I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012). 
 56. Perez, 144 T.C. at 56. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Wood, supra note 18. 
 59. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012); 25 Fed. Reg. 11201, 11490 (1960); Wood, supra note 18; 
see also 77 Fed. Reg. 3107 (2012); Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–188, 
110 Stat. 1755, 1839 (repealing the exclusion of punitive damages and the exclusion for damages 
not attributable to physical injuries or sickness). 
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payments) on account of personal injuries or physical sickness.”60 In 
Perez, the petitioner questioned the secretary’s interpretation that 
damages require a legal prosecution or the threat of one. Since the 
statute does not define damages, the court applied the Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.61 two-prong analysis 
of regulatory interpretations.62  
1.  Chevron Step One: Congress Has Not Spoken Directly on the 
Meaning of the Statute 
Under the first step of Chevron, a court considers whether 
Congress has spoken directly on the meaning of the statute at issue. 
Here, Perez argued that Congress did speak directly on the meaning of 
“damages” from a textualist perspective.63 Perez argued that the 
regulation’s interpretation is invalid because the basic dictionary 
meaning of the word “damages” does not require prosecution, the 
threat of one, or a settlement agreement.64 Perez also relied on 
previous case law policy rationale as a way to determine the plain 
meaning of “damages.”65 Courts have recognized the idea that 
personal injury recoveries are nontaxable because they represent a 
return of capital, making a person “whole.”66 Following the same 
logic, because the idea of the payment is to make the person whole, it 
should not matter if or when the person voluntarily subjects 
themselves to the damage so long as the payment the person receives 
is to make them whole. However, the court did not accept Perez’s 
argument that Congress spoke directly to the meaning of damages.67 
Instead, the court looked to the second step of the Chevron analysis 
and examined the legislative history to decide if the secretary’s 
interpretation of the statute was arbitrary or capricious.68 
 
 60. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012). 
 61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (asking if Congress has spoken directly on the issue and, if not, 
whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent); Mayo Found. for Med. 
Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011) (stating there is “no reason why our 
review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same 
extent as our review of other regulations). 
 62. Perez, 144 T.C. at 59. 
 63. Brief for Petitioner at 28–29, Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51 (2015) (No. 9103-12). 
 64. Id. at 29. 
 65. Id. at 30. 
 66. Roosevelt v. Comm’r, 43 T.C. 77, 88 (1964). 
 67. Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51, 59 (2015). 
 68. Id. 
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2. Chevron Step Two: Section 104(a)(2) Is a Reasonable 
Interpretation of Congress’s Intent 
Under the second step of the Chevron analysis, the court seeks to 
determine whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of 
Congress’s intent.69 Here, the court used the legislative history to 
guide its analysis.70 The court pointed to a recent significant change in 
the regulation: the fact that it no longer requires the payment to stem 
from a legal suit based on “tort-type or tort-type rights action.”71  
The first section 104 regulations, enacted in 1960, required that 
payments excluded under code section 104(a)(2) be “received through 
prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, 
or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such 
prosecution.”72 The 1960 requirement remained until the 2009 
proposed regulations were implemented in 2012, removing the 
requirement that the legal suit be based on “tort or tort type rights.”73 
The 2012 regulations responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Burke74, a case which restricted exclusion under code 
section 104(a)(2) by interpreting “tort or tort type rights” to mean 
damages from personal injuries only for which a full range of tort-type 
remedies were available.75 This tort-type remedy requirement was too 
narrow, as it precluded exclusion under “no-fault” statutes that do not 
provide traditional tort-type remedies.76 However, the change in the 
language of the regulation did not change the precedent that the 
taxpayer’s claim or settlement must be after the injuries occur.77 
The court therefore kept the requirement that the payment be 
received “through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or through a 
 
 69. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 70. Perez, 144 T.C. at 59. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 25 Fed. Reg. 11201 (1960).  See also, Perez, 144 T.C. at 58 (quoting id.).  
 73. See 74 Fed. Reg. 47152–53 (2009); 77 Fed. Reg. 3107 (2012). 
      74.   504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
 75. See id. Although code section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1996, partly in reaction to Burke, 
the treasury regulations were only amended in 2012. Ronald H. Jensen, When Are Damages Tax 
Free: The Elusive Meaning of “Physical Injury,” 10 PITT. TAX REV. 90–93 (2013); 74 Fed. Reg. 
47152 (2009). 
 76. See 74 Fed. Reg. 47152–53 (2009). In fact, in the summary of the comments to the final 
2012 regulations, one commentator suggested “that eliminating the tort type rights test would create 
confusion about what constitutes a personal injury. The commentator suggested that the regulations 
should retain the tort type rights test but clarify that meeting the test does not depend on the nature 
of the remedies or the state law characterization of the cause of action.” However, the final 
regulations did not adopt this comment. 77 Fed. Reg. 3107 (2012). 
 77. Perez, 144 T.C. at 60. 
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settlement agreement entered into in lieu of prosecution” under the 
second step of the Chevron analysis.78 The next question is whether 
Perez entered into a “settlement agreement in lieu of prosecution” as 
intended by the statute. 
B.  Contractual Language 
From the outset, the court stated that the issue in this case was not 
about determining whether human eggs are property but instead 
whether the contractual language and posture between Perez and The 
Donor Source qualified for the “settlement agreement in lieu of 
prosecution” requirement.79 The court ruled the contract did not 
qualify as a settlement agreement under the regulation because the 
contract Perez signed was a waiver, something done ad hoc, as 
opposed to a true settlement agreement which is signed post hoc.80 The 
court cited previous cases which also held compensation for advance 
waivers of possible future damages as taxable, and reiterated that the 
interpretation “reads most naturally . . . in terms of payment for 
injuries sustained prior to a suit or settlement agreement.”81 Further, 
the court acknowledged that although Perez had an interest in her 
personal rights, because the procedures were within the scope of 
which she consented, those rights were not violated.82 Because her 
rights were not violated, the pain and suffering was not the same kind 
of pain and suffering considered by code section 104(a)(2).83 
The court also explained its holding using two different policy 
rationales: one based on the case law’s general underlying rationale 
for the statute and one based on the practical implications of deciding 
the issue the other way.84 Case law states the underlying rationale for 
a section 104(a)(2) payment is to “‘make the taxpayer whole from a 
previous loss of personal rights.’”85 When individuals waive their 
rights, they do not get the benefit of recovering those rights tax-free.86 
Additionally, the practical reason for holding the payment as taxable 
 
 78. Id. at 58. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 60. 
 81. Id. (citing Starrels v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 646 (1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962)). 
 82. Id. at 61. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 60–63. 
 85. Id. at 60 (quoting Starrels, 35 T.C. 646 (1961)). 
 86. Id. at 60. 
50.3 GANO (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018  4:21 PM 
532 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:523 
is because the alternative would cause widespread abuse and 
mischief.87 The court gives an example of how athletes could exploit 
an alternative holding: 
A professional boxer could argue that some part of the 
payments he received for his latest fight is excludable 
because they are payments for his bruises, cuts, and 
nosebleeds. A hockey player could argue that a portion of his 
million-dollar salary is allocable to the chipped teeth he 
invariably suffers during his career . . . We don’t doubt that 
some portion of the compensation paid all these people 
reflects the risk that they will feel pain and suffering, but it’s 
a risk of pain and suffering that they agree to before they 
begin their work. And that makes it taxable compensation 
and not excludable damages.88  
Accordingly, after analyzing both the regulation and the contract, 
the court concluded that the payment received by Perez was taxable.89  
V.  ANALYSIS 
The court incorrectly analyzed the case as a contractual issue 
instead of a property right issue. Although the contract stated the 
compensation was not to buy Perez’s individual eggs,90 trial testimony 
suggested she had a property interest in her eggs.91 The court should 
have given deference to the testimony. The resultant tax consequences 
will be shown below.  
A.  Perez Had a Property Right in Her Eggs 
The court in Perez was quick to note that both parties agreed the 
payments were not about a sale or transfer of Perez’s eggs (thus not 
giving Perez a property interest in her eggs), but were rather for 
Perez’s performance of services.92 The court did not take issue with 
this because “Perez’s compensation depended on neither the quantity 
 
 87. Id. at 63. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 54 (“The Parties acknowledge and agree that the funds provided to the Donor shall 
not in any way constitute payment to Donor for her eggs.”). 
 91. Marie Sapirie & Andrew Velarde, Money From Egg Donation is Taxable Compensation, 
Court Holds, TAX NOTES (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/imp/9506896 (“[T]he fertility 
clinic’s chief operating officer said at trial that the lump sum amount that the egg donor provider 
would be paid was subject to reduction if no eggs were retrieved.”). 
 92. Perez, 144 T.C. at 56. 
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nor the quality of eggs retrieved, but solely on how far into the egg-
retrieval process she went.”93 The court referred to two cases that, 
unlike Perez, held the transfer of blood plasma was a transfer of 
property.94 In Green, the court held the transfer of blood plasma was 
a sale of tangible property rather than the performance of services 
because the taxpayer was paid based on quantity.95 In Garber, 
although the court did not make a ruling on the issue, the court 
indicated the transfer of blood plasma may be a sale of property 
because the taxpayer’s compensation was related to the amount of 
antibodies in the blood.96 
However, some commentators believe the trial court gave too 
much deference to the contract at the expense of the trial testimony.97 
The trial testimony showed the payments would have been reduced if 
no eggs were retrieved, indicating that, similar to Green, the quantity 
of eggs Perez produced was part of the consideration.98 This shows the 
contract could just as well have been classified as a mixture between 
property and services.99 The court, however, decided to give deference 
to the contractual language.100 The court should have given more 
deference to the trial testimony and, similar to Green, concluded Perez 
had a property right in her eggs.  
B.  Perez’s Tax Consequences: Egg Donation Costs as a Business 
Deduction 
Taxable income includes income from “gains derived from 
dealings in property.”101 So if a human egg is considered property, 
when the donor sells it “she will recognize taxable income to the extent 
she has ‘gain.’”102 To calculate gain, the statutory framework provides 
the appropriate method. Gain is the “excess of the amount realized” 
over the “adjusted basis.”103 Adjusted basis is the cost of the item 
 
 93. Id. at 57. 
 94. Id. at 56–57. (citing Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980) and United States v. Garber, 
607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
 95. Green, 74 T.C. at 1234. 
 96. Garber, 607 F.2d at 97. The court did not have to decide the tax issue because the appeal 
was for a criminal conviction. Id. at 100. 
 97. See Sapirie, supra note 91. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Perez, 144 T.C. at 57–58. 
 101. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1954). 
 102. Crawford, supra note 1, at 736. 
 103. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1993). 
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adjusted for any capital expenditures and depreciation.104 For 
example, if a seller sells her property for $6,000, the amount realized 
is $6,000.105 The seller’s basis in the property is usually the cost 
basis.106 If the same seller originally bought the property she is selling 
for $500, then that will be the cost basis.107 When she sells it several 
years later for $6,000, she will have a gain of $5,500.108 
The main issue when a person “sells” a part of the human body is 
how to calculate an appropriate cost basis. The cost basis in self-
created property is “limited to the cost of the materials used to create 
the property.”109 For example, when a painter paints a portrait, the 
basis the painter has in that portrait is the cost of the paint and canvas 
that can be allocated to that specific portrait.110 When it comes to a 
basis in the human body, there is overwhelming agreement in the tax 
community that a woman who sells her eggs would have a zero basis 
in the eggs unless she is able to allocate specific expenditures for her 
eggs (food, medication, etc.), which from an administrative standpoint 
is very impractical.111 So it would seem the entire gain would be taxed, 
as there would be no basis to subtract from the amount realized. 
However, Perez could use Green v. Commissioner to generate offsets 
to the gain, namely as business expenses under code section 162.112 
In Green, the taxpayer was able to deduct the costs allocable to 
income from blood donation as a business expense.113 In order to 
qualify for the business deduction, the court found that the taxpayer in 
Green was “actively engaged in the continual and regular process of 
producing and selling blood plasma to the lab for profit.”114 The court 
allowed a deduction for food expenses “beyond that necessary for her 
 
 104. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1993); I.R.C. § 1012 (2008); I.R.C. § 1016 (2010). 
 105. Crawford, supra note 1, at 736–37. 
 106. Id. at 737. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2008). 
 110. Crawford, supra note 1, at 737. 
 111. Having the costs accumulate over her entire life, even over the time of the surrogacy (e.g., 
the costs of choosing not to smoke) would be too hard to administer and thus would be too 
speculative for courts. See Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors’ Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress 
Must Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 948–50 (1999); see also 
Lisa Milot, What Are We—Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers 
of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1104 (2010); Crawford, supra note 1, 
at 737. 
 112. See I.R.C. § 162 (2012). 
 113. Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1230–32 (1980). 
 114. Id. at 1235. 
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personal needs”115 and the food and vitamins “intimately related to 
petitioner’s production of acceptable blood plasma . . . in furtherance 
of her business selling blood plasma.”116 The court also allowed her to 
deduct the travel expenses to the lab because she was transporting her 
“product” to the marketplace.117 The court stated: “The nature of her 
product was such that she could not transport it to market without her 
accompanying it. Of necessity, she had to accompany the blood 
plasma to the lab. Unique to this situation, petitioner was the container 
in which her product was transported to market.”118 
Here, Perez has a good argument that the frequency at which she 
donated her eggs would allow her to allocate and deduct some of the 
expenses as business expenses. She not only donated her eggs twice 
in 2009, she also donated her eggs in 2008.119 Whether this is 
continuous or frequent enough for the court is open for debate. 
However, because of how long the entire process takes, and the fact 
she did it three times in two years, Perez would have a strong 
argument.120 Similar to the taxpayer in Green, Perez could deduct the 
travel expenses as well as the food and vitamins directly allocable to 
the egg development. However, these costs would only likely 
accumulate once she signed the contract with The Donor Source, as 
her business relies solely on her qualifying for the contract.121 
VI.  WHETHER A WOMEN HAS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN HER EGGS IS 
STILL UNDECIDED 
The issue with classifying reproductive material as property for 
tax purposes poses issues that are both ethical and practical. Whereas 
courts have tackled the issue of property rights when it comes to 
sperm, blood, and breast milk, courts have yet to determine whether a 
woman has a property right in her eggs.122 When the next court is 
 
 115. Id. at 1236. 
 116. Id. at 1236 n.12. 
 117. Id. at 1237–38. 
 118. Id. at 1238. 
 119. See Sapirie, supra note 91. 
 120. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d. 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating 
that when determining whether something is considered inventory, “[a]lthough frequency and 
substantiality of sales are not usually conclusive, they occupy the preeminent ground in our 
analysis.”). 
 121. Having the costs accumulate over her entire life (e.g., the costs of choosing not to smoke) 
would be too hard to administer and thus would be too speculative for courts. See Soled, supra note 
111, at 948–50. 
 122. See Crawford, supra note 1. 
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presented with this issue, the court should clarify whether a woman 
has a property right in her eggs. 
 
